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Despite ongoing social and environ-
mental crises driven by human popu-
lation increase, public concern has
instead focused on demographic
aging as the greater challenge, even
suggesting that population growth
should be rekindled to combat it.
The economic and demographic
literatures suggest that the problems
associated with aging societies are
both overstated and manageable,
whereas trying to avoid aging by
boosting births or immigration is rela-
tively ineffective and creates even
greater problems.
A range of social, economic, and envir-
onmental beneﬁts are associated with
older age proﬁles and stable or declin-
ing populations, which more than
compensate for any economic
imposts to support the elderly.
Ecologists should study and commu-
nicate the negative impacts of human
population growth and excessive
population density and should not be
deterred by misguided economic
arguments favoring continued popula-
tion growth.
1Department of Biology and
Environmental Sciences, University of
Gothenburg, Box 463, SE-40530
Göteborg, Sweden
2School of Global Environmental
Sustainability, Colorado State
University, Fort Collins, CO 80523,
USA
3School of Agriculture and Food
Sciences, University of Queensland,
Brisbane 4072, Australia
*Correspondence:
frank.gotmark@gu.se (F. Götmark).As the nations of the world grapple with the task of creating sustainable
societies, ending and in some cases reversing population growth will be
necessary to succeed. Yet stable or declining populations are typically reported
in the media as a problem, or even a crisis, due to demographic aging. This is
misguided, as economic analyses show that the costs connected with aging
societies are manageable, while the economic, social, and environmental
beneﬁts of smaller populations are substantial. Earth’s human-carrying capac-
ity has been exceeded; hence, population growth must end and aging societies
are unavoidable. They should be embraced as part of a just and prosperous
future for people and the other species with whom we share our planet.
An Achievement Misdescribed as a Problem
How often do we read that aging is the great economic challenge of this century? Yet it is the
natural outcome of achieving society’s fundamental goals. Thanks to modern health care and
sanitation, increasing proportions of people born are living longer and healthier lives. Simulta-
neously, contraception has enabled families to avoid impoverishment from too many depend-
ents and liberated women to participate more equally in social, economic, and political realms,
enhancing democracy [1,2]. Fewer children means larger proportions in older age cohorts, as
well as deceleration and potential reversal of population growth. That is a very good thing, since
the future sustainability of human societies, avoiding resource wars, and halting the loss of
species and wild ecosystems all depend on ending population growth. Thus, making the
‘demographic transition’ (see Glossary) to small families with long-lived members, of which
aging populations are part and parcel, should be a goal of all countries around the world.
Figure 1 shows the association between increasing median age and decreasing population
growth rates. Over time, most countries will progress down this curve, while the curve itself
shifts to the right as life expectancy increases. At least 32 countries around the world have
decreasing populations and according to UN projections [5] one in four people are expected to
live in countries with a decreasing population by 2050.
There are many environmental beneﬁts to these trends. Halting population growth is essential
to mitigating global climate change [6–9], avoiding a mass extinction of Earth’s species [10–12],
feeding millions of malnourished people in the developing world [13], limiting freshwater
withdrawals from natural ecosystems while providing sufﬁcient water for human and wildlife
populations [14,15], and in general staying within the limits of prudent human use of the
biosphere [16–20]. If currently projected population growth occurs, reduction of per capita
consumption, while also essential, will be insufﬁcient. The recent ‘World scientists’ warning to
humanity’ advocates humane measures to reduce global fertility rates, noting that ‘continued
rapid population growth [is] a primary driver behind many ecological and even societal threats’
[21].Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2018.08.015 1
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
TREE 2432 No. of Pages 12
Glossary
Demographic aging: a
community’s composition changing
to contain smaller proportions in
young age cohorts and larger
proportions in older age cohorts.
Demographic transition: the shift
from relatively stable populations with
high mortality and high fertility to
relatively stable populations with low
mortality and low fertility. Population
growth is entailed by the lag
between mortality and fertility decline.
The transition is not automatic, as
sufﬁcient delay in fertility decline may
cause mortality to rise due to
overpopulation.
Dependency ratio: the ratio of age
groups deemed to be dependent to
age groups deemed to be
economically productive. Ages 0–14
and 65+ years are usually deemed
dependent, while those aged 15–64
years are deemed ‘working age’.
Ratios may be given for youth
dependency, old-age dependency,
or total dependency.
Ecological footprint: environmental
impacts resulting directly and
indirectly from an individual’s,
group’s, or country’s behaviors,
affected by both voluntary and
involuntary choices of consumption,
technology, resource management,
waste disposal, and reproduction.
Fertility: while ecologists deﬁne
fertility as the capacity to reproduce,
demographers are referring to the
reproduction actualized, often
quantiﬁed as the number of live
children born per woman (see ‘Total
fertility rate’).
Life expectancy: the years of
remaining life, from a designated age
(e.g., at birth, at age 65 years), when
half of the people currently of that
age will have died, given current age-
speciﬁc death rates.
Overpopulation: exists when a
human population is too large to
preserve ecosystem services (broadly
deﬁned) or too large to share the
landscape fairly with other species.
Ponzi scheme (or pyramid
scheme): a fraudulent arrangement
that requires the recruitment of ever-
more investors to pay unsustainably
high returns to earlier ones; named
after fund manager Charles Ponzi,
who used deposits from new
investors to pay dividends to prior
investors.
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Figure 1.
(Figure legend continued on the bottom of the next page.)
Annual Population Growth Rate and Median Age of Population Are Two of the Correlated
Parameters That Characterize the Demographic Transition. The 136 countries depicted comprise 90% of the
world population. (A) The situation in 2015; (B) the same countries in 2050, based on the UN 2017 medium-fertility variant
population projections. Under the 2050 UN scenario, 43 (32%) of 136 countries will have declining populations, up from
14% in 2015. The UN model assumes that fertility in all countries will converge toward near-replacement rate (two children
per woman) by 2100. Such projections should not be taken for granted, since they depend on continued improvements in
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Total fertility rate: the average
number of live children women would
bear in their lifetimes, if they had the
same probability of child-bearing in
each year of age as currently prevails
across the population and survived
to the end of their reproductive life;
not to be confused with birth rate
(births per 1000 people per year).Demographic aging thus should be seen as a desirable accomplishment [17,22]. Unfortu-
nately, many policymakers ﬁxated on maximizing economic growth instead treat aging pop-
ulations as a major problem [23,24]. Policies enacted to ﬁght this alleged threat include
incentives for citizens to have more children [25] and increased immigration levels [26]. These
policies could stall the transition to stable or smaller populations in many countries [27],
hindering progress toward national and global sustainability.
Here we review the pros and cons of aging and decreasing populations, with a view to providing
information to help conservation-minded ecologists more effectively advocate for sustainable
population policies. Aging populations pose challenges, yet the literature suggests that they are
manageable and often overstated [28,29]. Given smart, long-term economic planning, neces-
sary services can continue to be supported, while smaller populations provide opportunities to
advance environmental sustainability and maximize human wellbeing [30–32,88]. Thus, under
the assumption of such long-term planning, our hypothesis is that reduced population growth
and particularly population decline in aging countries beneﬁt people and the environment.
Solutions to the Manageable Problems of Aging and Shrinking Populations
Concerns about the economic impacts of aging fall into three main areas: potential worker
shortages, excessive expenditure on health services and old-age care, and shortfalls in pension
funding.
Most commentary has focused on a shrinking workforce, although this concern has the least
basis. We have found no evidence that aging populations have resulted in too few workers to
meet employment demands nor that they are likely to do so in the future. This misconception
arises because economic models typically assume that the proportion of people employed in
each age cohort (the ‘age-speciﬁc workforce participation rate’) will remain unchanged regard-
less of changes in a society’s age structure, locking the size of the workforce to the relative size
of age cohorts [24,33]. Basic market theory, by contrast, anticipates that tightening labor
markets will recruit people who are currently not working, by offering them better terms of
employment or addressing their barriers to access, while also driving productivity gains through
greater investment in staff and equipment [34]. Historical data support these hypotheses of
elastic labor supply: among the 36 countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), although some countries are much more demographically mature than
others, aging is not related to the proportion of total population employed [35] nor to changes in
GDP per capita [36].
Given stagnating wages and high youth unemployment in many developed nations, and the
potential for automation to render many jobs redundant in the future, worker shortages do not
appear to be a pressing problem. Tighter labor markets increase wages [34] and thus can help
reduce economic inequality – which is a growing problem. In the developed world, countries
with rapid population growth tend to have greater economic inequality than countries with
older, more stable populations, as high underemployment leads to low-paid or insecure work
[28]. Economic inequality, in turn, is more closely related to personal and societal wellbeing than
GDP per capita [37]. So while aging, shrinking societies might have fewer total workers than
they would if they continued to grow, those workers could do better economically, socially, and
environmentally than they would in a fast-growing country.access to contraception and acceptance of smaller family norms in patriarchal societies [3,4]. These projections also
assume relatively low levels of international migration; historically, migration levels have proved even harder to predict than
changes in fertility. Data source: UN World Population Prospects 2017 [5].
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are indeed likely to increase as societies age, due to there being a higher proportion of people in
their ﬁnal years of life. However, this increase will be much less than is implied by the often-cited
‘old-age dependency ratio’. This ratio gives an exaggerated impression of the ﬁnancial
burden of aging. As longevity has increased in the developed world, people have remained
healthy and independent for longer [38]. The over-65s are contributing more to society,
including in paid work and in care-giver roles. Alternative measures of aging, such as proximity
to death and prevalence of disability, better capture this reality [38–41]. They reﬂect much
smaller and more manageable changes (Box 1).
Other factors besides aging have played a much greater role in driving recent health care cost
increases, including an expanding range of costly treatments and diagnostics, and price
gouging by service providers and drug companies in some countries [45–47]. Addressing
productivity and institutional factors and investing more in preventive care can help keepBox 1. Ill-Conceived Problems, Ill-Conceived Solutions
The ‘aging crisis’ is most commonly argued citing ‘old-age dependency ratios’, the number of people aged 65+ years
divided by the number aged 15–64 years (nominally ‘working age’). This implies that all people aged 15–64 years are
productively employed and all people over 65 years are dependent on them. This is not only wrong in the present, but it
ignores the likelihood that work and health patterns will shift over time. As people remain healthy for longer, they are
choosing later retirement and deferring rather than extending their ‘burden’ on health- and aged-care services (Figure I).
Solutions to aging are equally ill conceived. Boosting population growth, through more births or immigration, is often
presented as necessary to address aging. However, these ‘remedies’ have much greater impact on the size of the
population than they do on the extent of aging (Figure II). Since population growth cannot go on forever, aging is not
avoided but merely deferred. The result is a large and persistent increase in population pressure for a small and
ephemeral lessening of aging. These conclusions have been reached repeatedly in analyses of a range of countries.
According to Germany’s Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, ‘a higher level of inward migration over the long-term . . . would only
have a marginal impact on the relative populations of age groups’ [43]. Australia’s Productivity Commission concluded
‘Realistic changes in migration levels also make little difference to the age structure of the population in the future, with
any effect being temporary’ [44]. For both Germany and Australia, however, increased net migration has the potential to
add many millions to their total future populations, countering any improvements in ecological footprint per person.
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Figure I. How Can We Measure Aging Meaningfully? Using the ﬂawed ‘old-age dependency ratio’, aging is
projected to rise alarmingly. Using an alternative ratio based on years of remaining life expectancy is likely to better reﬂect
health care-burdens, while a ratio of disabled to able-bodied adults better reﬂects aged-care burdens. These two
measures anticipate modest and manageable change. Data from [40].
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Figure II. Effects of Demographic Variables on the UK’s Projected Aging and Population Growth
For a Figure360 author presentation of Figure II, see the ﬁgure legend at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2018.08.015
The 2016-based projections by UK’s Ofﬁce of National Statistics provide a principal projection and projections that vary
longevity, fertility, or migration singly while keeping other variables constant [42]. The chart maps outcomes for the high
and low assumptions for each variable. While the span of each line depends on the arbitrary choice of high and low
levels, the slope indicates the ‘cost’ of increasing population growth relative to the ‘beneﬁt’ of lowering old-age
proportion. Old-age proportion is particularly sensitive to increasing lifespan. Longevity also increases population, but
lengthening generations (deferred childbearing) can counter this. Higher fertility is somewhat effective at lowering the
proportion of older people, but mainly by lifting the proportion of children, not of working-age people. Raising
immigration is particularly ineffective at moderating old-age proportion, relative to the amount of population growth
caused.medical costs manageable as societies age [35,39,45,48]. Achieving better health through
better treatments is a success that is worth a little more spending.
Finally, the issue of pension funding is complex because developed countries have a wide
diversity of pension arrangements. The most common remedy recommended to reduce costs
is to lift the pension entitlement age, and many developed countries have already scheduled
increases. However, mandatory increases can be regressive and arguably unjust [49]. Lon-
gevity gains have not been enjoyed equally by all economic classes; for example, rich French-
men can expect 13 years more life than the poor [50]. As poorer workers also have less capacity
to save for retirement and may perform more physical work that is difﬁcult to sustain, it hardly
seems fair to make them pay for the longevity enjoyed by rich people. Also, unless job marketsTrends in Ecology & Evolution, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 5
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at least partly offset by the economic beneﬁts of smaller youth cohorts and less population
growth. Such savings, which could be used to shore up pension ﬁnancing, include reduced
expenditure on family allowances, schools and education, unemployment beneﬁts, and infra-
structure creation [51].
Sensible policy changes can address potential funding shortfalls by enhancing voluntary
trends, such as removing disincentives for those who want to defer retirement, or making
actuarially fair pension adjustments that pay higher annuities to later retirees [52,53]. For
example, Australia’s means-tested government pension discourages both saving and work
beyond retirement age by low-income people, while the cost of making the pension universal
could be readily recouped by capping over-generous retirement-savings tax concessions to
the rich. With a universal pension, New Zealand achieves higher levels of over-65 workforce
participation than Australia and lower levels of poverty among the elderly [54]. Likewise, in
Norway removal of a pension earnings test considerably increased the labor supply from older
workers [53].
Pensions are part of a social contract: by and large, citizens of wealthy developed nations have
agreed that they owe one another a decent retirement. With appropriate policies, continued
productivity increases can cover rising pension costs without imposing on workers. Talk of
pension deﬁcits or shortfalls apply only when pension funds are quarantined from other
revenue. This might have made sense when public pensions were phased in but is less
equitable than simply funding pensions like other income support, through progressive taxa-
tion, as many countries do. The most generous pension systems could need trimming back; a
recent OECD report stated that ‘over the last two years, the statutory retirement age was
changed in six OECD countries’ and ‘about one-third of OECD countries changed contribu-
tions and another third modiﬁed beneﬁt levels for all or some retirees’ [55]. However, from a
welfare-maximizing perspective, most countries have better options than reducing retirement
incomes for common citizens or artiﬁcially boosting populations. As with increased health-care
costs, potential pension-funding shortfalls can be met in ways that further the common good.
The most commonly prescribed policies to address aging endeavor to boost birth rates or
increase immigration levels [89]. The goal is to dilute older citizens with ever bigger youth
cohorts in an endless Ponzi scheme [56]. Such measures have little impact on aging (Box 1) or
on the economic challenges that aging can cause. However, they can rapidly boost total
population numbers and hence are quite effective at increasing countries’ ecological foot-
print. Even from a purely economic perspective, such ‘cures’ for a nonexistent ‘disease’ make
little sense: the cost of additional infrastructure to accommodate population growth is far
greater than the extent to which it could reduce aging-related costs to the economy [51].
Note that we are not arguing against all immigration, any more than we are arguing for
childlessness. We argue only that population aging is not a valid reason for elevating immigra-
tion or births. When setting policy, we should consider the beneﬁts of older and smaller
populations as well as their costs.
The Beneﬁts of Aging and Shrinking Populations
While aging and shrinking societies bring manageable economic challenges, they also bring
economic beneﬁts. Shrinking labor pools can tighten labor markets, increasing workers’
wages. They help make potential workers in overlooked groups, such as women, young
people who require training, or older people themselves, more appealing to employers. In6 Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy
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out of home ownership, making it impossible for them to build equity in the way previous
generations did; slowing population growth in such cities can ease this problem. Decreasing
populations also ease crowding, an often overlooked issue that harms quality of life through
excessively long commutes and degraded or unavailable public amenities [57]. In all of these
and other ways, even if the economy is shrinking, per capita incomes and wealth can rise, along
with many other determinants of wellbeing [30].
Lower fertility rates lead to smaller families. One important yet often overlooked economic
beneﬁt of this is an increase in the per capita value of bequests, as older generations pass on
their wealth to younger ones [31]. Not only through inheritance but throughout life, investment
per child is increased when children are fewer [29]. A well-resourced start in life leads to greater
wealth accumulation throughout life. In this way, smaller families help to decrease poverty and
lead to greater economic equality across society as a whole.
Above all, smaller populations have potentially enormous environmental beneﬁts. In their most
recent report, the IPCC [7] identiﬁed population and consumption growth as the main drivers of
increased anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions leading to climate change. Despite
energy-efﬁciency improvements in recent decades, carbon emissions have continued to rise.
In regard to total energy use, population growth has a multiplier effect, such that ‘At the global
level, per capita primary energy consumption rose by 30% from 1970–2010; due to population
growth, total energy use has increased by 130% over the same period’ [7]. However, following
a lower global population growth path could provide 16–29% of the emission reductions
needed by 2050 to keep average global temperature increases below 2C, with the effect
becoming even more signiﬁcant by the end of the century (delivering 37–41% of necessary
emission reduction) [58].
Aging populations provide a potential for further emission reductions due to declining age-
speciﬁc consumption at older ages. Although there are sector, timing, and scale-effect dis-
crepancies [33,58–60], in the long run population aging is expected to reduce emissions [31].
For example, by 2050 population aging in China could reduce global energy-related emissions
by 700 Mt carbon dioxide [60]. Thus, the trends of population decline expected in 43 countries
in 2050 (Figure 1) are likely to have climate-related beneﬁts [61].
Excessive human numbers strongly contribute to the Earth’s sixth mass extinction of wild
species [10–12,62,63]. Habitat loss is a major cause of species endangerment, and population
growth contributes strongly to habitat loss [64]. The highest-ranked threats against red-listed
species are all partly population driven, including overexploitation, agricultural expansion, urban
development, invasive species, pollution, and climate change (in that order) [65]. In aging and
low-fertility countries, all of these current and future extinction drivers can be reduced by
declining human populations.
Smaller populations reduce pressures to convert forests and wetlands to agriculture or to dam
and drain rivers to provide water for agriculture and growing cities. They open possibilities for
rewilding lands [66] that are no longer needed for agriculture, forestry, or other intensive human
use (Figure 2).
In areas such as the Great Plains of the USA [74] or the Oder Delta (Figure 2), population
declines give opportunities to protect and restore wildlife. Fewer people provides space to
conserve more biodiversity and share the landscape fairly with other species [75].Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 7
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Figure 2. Declining Populations and Lower Population Density in Aging Countries Increase Opportunities for
Self-Sufﬁciency, Nature Conservation, Rewilding, and Nature-Oriented Tourism and Education. While
population growth reduces the capacity of individual nations to provide food and freshwater to their citizens [67,68],
declining populations could improve agricultural self-sufﬁciency and food security. In addition, with less emphasis on yield
maximization, more ecologically friendly food production systems could be adopted, with fewer pesticides and energy-
demanding artiﬁcial fertilizers and more biodiversity preserved in agricultural systems [69,70]. (A) Mixed agricultural
landscape in Italy (photograph Creative Commons) and (B) organic farm, Hungary (photograph by Dr László Kiss). Many
countries are struggling to meet the Nagoya goal of the UN’s Convention on Biological Diversity to preserve 17% of their
land, lakes, and watercourses for nature conservation (itself a woefully insufﬁcient target). Continued population growth will
make this even harder, while population decline will open more land for ‘hands-off’ protection, restoration, or rewilding [71–
73]. (C) Spontaneous forest regrowth on abandoned agricultural land, which over time can develop into old-growth forest
(Vosges Mountains, eastern France; photograph by Annik Schnitzler). (D) An actively managed site in the Rewilding Europe
Network: the Oder Delta of Poland and Germany (Peene River, near Anklamer Stadtbruch, Germany; photograph by Solvin
Zankl). (E) Habitat conservation and rewilding open new opportunities for nature-oriented tourism and education
(photograph by Doru Oprisan).
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Box 2. Japan: Showing the Way with Successful De-Growth?
Japan’s population density (351 persons per km2) is one of the highest in the world; approximately 94% of Japanese
people live in urban areas, and at 37 million Tokyo is the most populous metropolitan area in the world. Urban crowding
and long commutes take a toll on Japanese quality of life and the country has a large global ecological footprint [76].
Increasing life expectancy (83.3 years in 2015) and a low fertility rate (recently 1.4) has led to an aging population, with
median age 47 years [5]. The population slowly began to shrink in 2009 and depopulation of rural areas began much
earlier. With a restrictive immigration policy, Japan’s population is likely to continue to decline. This opens the possibility
of a ‘depopulation dividend’, deﬁned by Peter Matanle as the ‘achievement from depopulation of positive gains that
contribute to socio-cultural, political-economic, and environmentally sustainable living’ [77].
One example comes from Sado, a self-proclaimed ‘eco-island’ where rain forest habitat, a protected ibis species
(Nipponia nippon), and unique traditions have favored tourism. In addition to ecotourism, Sado has tertiary education
courses in environmental management, traditional crafts, and caring for the elderly. These initiatives have opened career
opportunities and consequently younger people feel less need to leave the island [77]. Examples of such ‘creative
depopulation’ [78] have inspired Japanese policy analysts to explore how demographic de-growth can be a positive
experience. Economist Matsutani Akihiko [30] emphasizes the opportunity to reduce production capacity and public-
works spending and to rethink public services and retirement policies systematically, with a focus on quality of life
instead of economic growth.
For the most part, observers outside Japan have failed to notice such positive approaches. David Pilling, a former Tokyo
bureau chief for the Financial Times, found that Japan is ‘regularly written about as though it were some kind of basket
case stuck in perpetual stagnation and without the wits to haul itself out of misery. And yet Japan’s supposed misery –
as measured by nominal GDP – really didn’t feel like misery at all [when Pilling lived there.] Unemployment was extremely
low, prices stable or falling, and most people’s living standards rising’ [79].
Just as it led Asia in the booming post-war growth period, Japan now is positioned to lead the region into an era of
successful demographic de-growth. Fewer people in Japan (potentially 18 million fewer by 2050) would create beneﬁts
such as reduced greenhouse gas emissions, fewer demands on ocean ﬁsh stocks and tropical timber, and quite
possibly more enjoyable lives for the people of Japan [80].Perhaps the most important point is that fewer people can lead to comprehensive environ-
mental beneﬁts in many countries in the future: less water use, less energy demand and fewer
cars, lower food imports, and less pollution and toxins generated. Societies instead could
choose to waste these potential environmental beneﬁts by increasing per capita consumption.
However, this works in the other direction, too: responsible societies can choose to multiply
environmental beneﬁts by driving down per capita consumption while also decreasing the
number of ‘capitas’. There is nothing a society can do to decrease its demands on the
environment more effectively than decreasing its population.
Interestingly, countries with stable or declining populations can remain quite robust economi-
cally. Some Eastern European countries with stable or declining populations, such as Estonia
and the Czech Republic, are advancing strongly and deserve further study. A broad analysis of
Germany concluded that the positives of aging societies outweighed the negatives, ﬁnding that
an older, shrinking population is likely to be more educated (more investment per child), cleaner
(generating less pollution and fewer greenhouse gases), richer (through the concentration of
inheritance), healthier (with its citizens spending a greater proportion of life in wellness), and
happier overall [31]. Germany has been the economic powerhouse of Europe in recent
decades, and Japan surpasses OECD averages on many economic and social welfare
measures (Box 2).
Concluding Remarks: Smaller Human Populations, a Real Opportunity
We have presented evidence that aging and declining human populations are essential to future
wellbeing and environmental sustainability. We argue that the evidence supports our general
hypothesis that reduced population growth and population decline in aging countries beneﬁtTrends in Ecology & Evolution, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 9
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Outstanding Questions
In what ways do smaller human pop-
ulations further the wellbeing (compre-
hensively understood) of members of
modern industrial societies? In what
ways do they harm them?
What rates of population decrease are
manageable for modern industrialized
societies? What rates cause serious or
unavoidable problems?
What roles do population growth rates
and population densities play in fur-
thering or retarding human wellbeing,
considered economically, socially, and
environmentally?
What policies can be effective in limit-
ing any harmful impacts of human
population decrease? What policies
can help nations maximize the environ-
mental and social beneﬁts of popula-
tion decrease? What policy lessons
can be drawn from national experien-
ces to date?
What roles must limiting total numbers
or limiting overall economic activity
play in creating environmentally sus-
tainable societies? Can human socie-
ties be sustainable without limiting their
numbers or without limiting overall
economic activity?
Can cross-country studies reveal how
aging societies with declining popula-
tion numbers perform in various
respects compared with countries with
population increase?
What roles have human population
growth and human population densitypeople and the environment, with appropriate policies and planning. Several countries are now
discussing policies for dealing with aging and decreasing populations, hopefully with a focus on
environment protection and social wellbeing rather than maximizing GDP [6,79,81]. One could
consider population aging on the basis of alternative hypotheses; for instance, that endlessly
growing economies and populations are possible due to human ingenuity [82] or that attempts
to limit population growth in modern capitalist economies are futile [83]. As realists, we reject
the ﬁrst alternative hypothesis, while as optimists we have presented evidence and arguments
against the second.
The reluctance of ecologists and social scientists to discuss the negative impacts of population
growth has given a free hand to advocates of economic growth at all costs to focus selectively
on problems attributed to aging, without acknowledging that their remedies entail greater
problems. The same coyness might explain the lack of population-related indicators of
biodiversity threats in the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Aichi targets, compared with
the high representation of consumption-related indicators [84]. The UN’s Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals also fail to address population growth as a barrier to the achievement of most of
its goals [85]. As the saying goes, we can’t manage what we don’t measure, and we are clearly
failing to rein in unsustainable trends while we ignore human population dynamics.
Sustainability is linked inevitably to population matters and respect for limits [86]. Given current
consumption levels, many nations are already grossly overpopulated, as is the world as a
whole [32,87]. We admit that aging and shrinking populations present challenges. However,
ending population growth is not optional; it is a necessary transition that all nations will inevitably
face. Aging societies should not be seen as a problem but as an achievement that opens
possibilities to create even better societies that are sustainable over the long term (see
Outstanding Questions).
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